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One would not have thought the EC capable of doing much to promote the 
integration of the Soviet-bloc countries into the EC at the time Gorbachev 
came to power in Moscow.  This changed not only because of Gorbachev's 
Westpolitik.  It was  the EC's adoption of the Single European Act  (SEA)  which 
created a basis for deepening EX  integration--not least by replacing unanimity 
by a qualified majority necessary for reaching decisions pertinent to those 
principal articles of the Treaty of Rome which regard the establishment of the 
interior market--which then became the basis for the broadening of cooperation 
(if  not integration)  now evident.  The political climte  for adoption of the 
SEA was conditioned by President Reagan's announcement in March 1983 of the 
American intention to pursue the SDI program.  The SEA set EC cooperation on a 
firmer footing, without which it would have had no dynamic through which to 
take action following the democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe 
in late 1989. 
Before  We Forget:  The  Renaissance  of  West European  Cooperation 
The first EC framework program for research and development was approved 
in 1983 to cover the period 1985-87.  But SDI, by posing so clear an economic 
challenge, accelerated intergovernmental cooperation in Europe on 
technological development, both inside and outside the EEC.  Within the EC in 
particular, the SDI program provided an impetus for closer cooperation on 
technology and security issues.  The political challenge it represented added 
to the momentum for the Single European Act  (SEA)  adopted in 1986, which also 
included specific responsibilities for the Comnity  in the fields of 
industrial research and technology.  (However,  the SEA represented mre  of an 
impetus to further integration than the foundation of a Comnity-wide 
technological development program.  There is  an appreciable technology gap 
among the very members of the Comnity  itself.)  Of course EC technology 
policy is itself a bit of a misnomer.  Any technology "policy" is only an 
ensemble of many more specific policy issues, which are themselves moreover 
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difficult to separate from other broader policy areas such as science and 
education.  Moreover, governments are not always the most influential actors 
in making such a policy. 
SDI soon came to be viewed by the principal West European governments as 
an American challenge to them.  The nature of the challenge was  defined by the 
two principal programnatic responses to the SDI announcement:  the French- 
inspired Eureka program and the German-inspired European Defense Initiative 
(EDI).  The former responded to SDI as an economic challenge from the U.S.,  by 
seeking to promote technological cooperation in Europe, in order to avoid 
losing markets created by SDI-related technology spin-offs and to avoid losing 
*ole  industries to American capital.  The latter responded to SDI as a 
security challenge, since SDI would not have been able to protect Western 
Europe against Soviet medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, by seeking 
to extend air defenses in Western Europe. 
President Mitterrand's emphasis on space technology in a hueka framework 
created an impression that he wished to promote a European version of SDI. 
However, he probably wanted only to avoid a West European "brain drain" to the 
U.S.  and to guarantee further development of French high technology.  (In  the 
same line was  the emphasis by Paris on nuclear-powered submarines in 1984-85, 
as against enhancing conventional forces, which ran against NATO trends at the 
time.)  There were great hopes that the May 1985 meeting between President 
Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl could harmonize French and German responses to 
SDI, but this was not to be.  The result was interpreted at the time as a 
difficult disagreement, but in retrospect it appears more as a decision to 
follow a two-track policy, each track responding to one of the two challenges 
that SDI represented to Western Europe.  Thus Kohl embraced SDI while 
supporting Eureka as a civilian project that did not substitute for it. 
Meanwhile, Paris and Bonn began the process of deepening their defense 
cooperation in practical term.= 
Eureka was a kench  initiative outside the EC framework.  It differed 
significantly from EC-sponsored cooperation:  Eureka projects were to be 
mrket-oriented  (not  research-oriented), initiated freely by enterprises 
1.  Joseph Fitchett, "France, in Strategy Shift, Takes on Defense of West 
Germany,f'  International Herald Tribune, 6-7 July 1985, pp. 1, 5. 
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(without  reference to defined research programs), and financed entirely by 
enterprises and governments (without  50% participation from Brussels).  In the 
end a dozen and a half countries signed up to participate; priorities were set 
in the fields of computers and computerized telecorrsnunications, robotics, 
lasers, and biotechnology. 
The Japanese government at first felt that Europe was too far away to 
warrant their serious concern, and the Japanese public continue to think of 
divided mope  more as an integral aspect of U.S.-Soviet  confrontation  than as 
the result in Europe of U.S.-Soviet  global conflict.  Moreover, the affair 
over the Kurile Islands has not encouraged Japan to concern itself with 
distinctions among the smll  east European states.  Nevertheless, over the 
past year Japan has promised substantial financial support to aid in the 
economic reconstruction of central and eastern Europe:  and the U.S. has also 
done so, feeling that it cannot "give uptt  Europe.  The hesitation of the U.S. 
and Japan reflects an emerging tendency in global economic affairs for the 
U.S.  to look first to Latin America and Japan to look first to Asia, leaving 
the EC with Africa (under the CAP  umbrella). 
At the same time, the American government's pursuit of SDI guaranteed the 
aggravation of  its budget deficit to the point where, by the end of the 
decade, it would be unrealistic to expect the U.S.  to be able to give 
substantial financial assistance to the former members of the "Soviet bloc" to 
help them make the transition to pluralist democracy.  Indeed, before the 
democratic revolutions that swept Central and Eastern Europe, President Bush, 
in his public declarations in mid-1989 repeated that the development of East- 
West relations in Europe was principally an intra-European matter.  Events in 
Nicaragua and Panm  underlined American preoccupations with their own 
hemisphere.  Under the new administration, Washington felt that it should 
continue to have a role not only in Europe but also in Asia and Africa; yet in 
the near term its principal responsibility would be Latin America. 
Washington supported democratization in Central and Eastern Europe with 
good rhetoric but felt that it was for Western Europe to provide financial 
support.  When it became clear that democratization in Central and Eastern 
Europe was not only accelerating but also broadening to encompass all 
countries in the region, the U.S.  government refined its position, underlining 
the continuing American interest in security arrangements in Europe.  However, 
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the idea that financial aid should be a West European matter was  equally 
underlined; only domestic political pressure brought the Bush Administration 
to make any financial conanitment at all. 
The International Organization of Economic Relations in -ope 
EIE-ISTA43EA:  The Notso-eternal  Riangle 
Since the creation of an EC-EFTA  "European economic area" (EEA)  was 
agreed as a comnon objective in 1984,= it had become evident that this would 
take much detailed work.  However, three fundamental problem arose from the 
basic difference between the EC as a supranational institution  with political 
aspirations and the EFTA  as a free-trade organization without central 
decision-making institutions.  First, the EEA  was  fundamentally  distinct from 
the EC  internal market.  The EC gave priority to establishing the latter, in 
which latter only its own members could participate.  Second, EFTA  wanted not 
only full participation in the EEA  but also the creation of EEA  institutions 
giving them equality of participation in decision-making, particularly 
regarding regulation of public-sector activities.  But in both these respects, 
the EC has always privileged its political autonomy.  In addition EFTA  had 
proposed its industrial development fund for Portugal, created in 1977 and 
maintained despite Portugal's accession to the Rome Treaty, as a model for 
regional assistance that could be available to countries such as Spain and 
Greece which (with  the UK) run a deficit in their trade with EFTA.  But the EC 
would have found it difficult to swallow an absence of control over how such 
funds are spent within its member countries.  Third, there would be huge 
problem even if the EFTA countries were to modify their product standards in 
consonance with those of the EC internal market:  the resources necessary to 
verify the consonance between the six EFTA countries and the internal mrket 
could approach those necessary to negotiate an accession; whereas the EC has 
always sought to assure a balance between political and economic costs and 
benefits.  Moreover, once those standards were harmonized, it would have 
remined to be determined whether EC law could be altered unilaterally at a 
2.  Originally called the "European economic space," but altered in 
response to British criticism that the word "space" was vague and indefinite. 
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subsequent date (thus  touching again the issue of EC autonomy).  Furthermore, 
EFTA has no institutions equivalent to the European Court which could restrain 
its members if the rules were infringed, and did not wish to compromise its 
members sovereignty through binding adjudication by EC instances:  this 
represented a potential advantage for the EFTA mernbers,  as they would not have 
been obliged, for instance, to apply EC import quotas.  On the other hand, for 
the EFTA members to accept all of the EC conditions and provisions would leave 
them in a situation worse than if they simply became EC members:  they would 
be nothing but agenda-takers. 
Like EFTA, CMEA  as an organization lacked central institutions  that could 
exercise authority on a regular basis in the name of its menbers.  Like the 
members of the EFTA, the CMEA  countries were also worried about the EC 
internal market.  They were unhappy in particular about trade preferences 
given to EC  members and about the uniform application of EC-wide regulations. 
The EC internal market raised the further possibility, for the CMEA  countries, 
that EC-wide social policy would create demands for protection against their 
own less expensive imports by raising labor costs in the EC1s  poorer members. 
Before the fall of the comnunist-party regimes in Central and Eastern 
Europe, it was  conceivable that EFTA could be a halfway-house to full EC 
membership for the small CMEA  countries, particularly if  it provided free 
access to the EC mrket, free-trade arrangements for mnufactures, and the 
free movement of capital and labor.  The CMEA countries would have further 
required assurances that EFTA membership did not disadvantage them by 
subjecting their national economies to additional restraints in their dealings 
with the EEC.  Such a  development would have necessitated EC recognition of 
EFTA national standards rather than harmonization; a promise to extend such 
recognition to all future EFTA members; and the establishment by EFTA of 
requirements for economic reform that Soviet-bloc countries would have to meet 
to obtain EFTA membe~ship.~  However, the CMEA countries were not necessarily 
counting on EFTA to provide it entrke to the EC.  Indeed, EEC-Q.IEA  relations 
began to thaw not long after Gorbachev's election as CPSU  general secretary. 
3.  See, for example:  Holger Schrnieding, "The Efta Option For Eastern 
Europe: Comecon And  The Cormunity,ll  Financial Times, 2  August 1989, p. 17. 
This text dates from 11 January 1991. "The Architecture of E.C.  Relations ...," page 6 
In autumn 1985 the CMEA's general secretary Sychev opined that an EEC- 
CMEA  joint declaration could open the way for bilateral negotiations between 
the EC and individual CMEA members.  This amounted to an admission that the 
two organizations were unequal.  The EC was still cautious.  In a letter to 
each of the seven CMEA  governments, with a copy to the CMEA secretariat in 
Moscow, EC Vice President Willy de Clercq invited them to accredit some of 
their diplomts in Brussels to the EC.  This so-called "parallel approach" 
sought to extract a  precise Soviet grant of autonomy to the East European 
countries in bilateral trade negotiations with the EC. 
The outlook for a positive response was not impressive at first.  Hungary 
had been insisting since 1982, in informal talks with the EC, that 
quantitative restrictions on her exports to the Cormunity were illegal under 
the GATT  (which  Hungary had joined in the early 1970s) and so should be 
entirely lifted; in return, the EC insisted that not all GATT  rules could 
really apply to Hungary, which was still a state-trading country.  The USSR 
and GDR had no reason to negotiate:  most Soviet exports, mainly energy and 
raw  materials, are not subject to EC restrictions; the GDR's trade with the 
FRG was considered internal EC trade.  Poland and Bulgaria seemed satisfied to 
renegotiate agreements for the period 1980-85 which covered agricultural 
products, and Czechoslovakia went only so far as to suggest replacing EC 
quotas on industrial imports by voluntary restraint agreements. 
Following Soviet approval of closer bilateral relations, linked to some 
kind of EC-CMEA agreement, however, hopes grew.  Huge increases in subsidized 
agricultural sales by the EC to the Q.IEA  countries reflected that development. 
The EC adopted measures permitting sale of over 200,000 tons of surplus beef 
to the USSR and Eastern Europe in autumn 1985 and announced cuts in beef 
prices to promote further sales in early 1986.  Also in early 1986, the EC 
Comnission adopted a new system of export subsidies to melt a million-ton 
butter mountain:  the Soviets bought 100,000 tons that April, followed by 
another 280,000 in early 1987.  The USSR also used EC export subsidies to buy 
at least 700,000 tons of wheat and barley during 1986. 
This was not occurring in a vacuum.  In May 1986, after the Chernobyl 
accident, the EEC introduced a temporary ban on food imports from Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union.  This exacerbated Hungary's trade deficit with 
the EC and led to a deficit in its overall trade with the West during this 
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period.  Along with the fall in world oil prices, which decreased Hungarian 
revenues for Soviet oil reexported to the West and oil products, it made the 
economic outlook worse for the next year or two. 
It need not be mentioned that this significantly affected the hard 
currency earnings of the CMEA countries.  Of course there was a little 
internal EEC politicking going on too.  The EEC's inability to agree on safe 
levels of radioactivity in food was  due minly  to the FRG's desire to protect 
its dairy exports and Italy its vegetable exports.  Any such agreed levels 
would have governed intra-EEC comnerce as well as imports from the Soviet 
bloc; the CMEA-related level was  subsequently extended to at least October 
1987.  It seemed to some observers, including in Western Europe, that all this 
was merely a camouflage for promoting EC comrcial  interests. 
Only after agreeing the budget reform package of February 1988 was the EC 
truly able to organize its attention to external relations, including such 
issues as monetary reform and lifting trade barriers as well as relations with 
the EFTA countries.  Indeed in early 1988, the EC was  more concerned with EFTA 
than with the CMEA.  In late June, the EC and CMEA  initialed a joint 
declaration (not  tantamount to mutual recognition) that left intact the status 
of West Berlin as part of the EC as well as Quadripartite responsibility for 
the city.  Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the USSR, and the GDR requested 
accreditation for missions to the EC even before the declaration was signed. 
Following the joint declaration, the F'RG  publicly gave Delors firm support for 
an extension of his mandate as president of the EC Comission. 
This did not occur without differences of opinion inside the EC itself. 
Greece, which assumed the presidency for the second half of 1988, had 
suggested, even before the signature of the EC-CMEA joint declaration, that 
special consideration be given Soviet interests; however, most other members 
of the Comunity did not want to treat the Soviets better than the smaller 
CMEA members.  Further differences of approach emerged during the last three 
months of the year.  The twelve foreign ministers agreed to try to formulate a 
document to serve as  framework in defining the EC1s  position toward the Soviet 
bloc, to be discussed at the December 1988 surranit  in Rhodes.  At the same 
time, the presidency (Greece)  was instructed to prepare an analogous text to 
present in Vienna at the CSCE conference, and the EC Comission began to draft 
yet another document on the EC1s  economic relations with the CMEA.  Through 
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this process it emerged that one tendency in the EC,  represented by the United 
Kingdom and Portugal, preferred to take a favorable but wait-and-see attitude 
toward the developments in Central and Eastern Europe which had then begun and 
were soon to lead to the overthrow of one-party rule.  An opposing tendency 
argued that Gorbachev's policies deserved more active support because they 
were in the West's interest. 
EC-CMEA cooperation in exchanges of information and statistics, and 
standardization  and environmental protection got quickly under way in early 
1989, and were thought extendable to fields such as developing passenger and 
freight transport facilities, and in science and technology, where both 
economic groupings have comparable long-term prograrrtnes.  The USSR was clearly 
frustrated at the EC1s  regarding scientific cooperation as a possible threat 
to Western security.  This was particularly so in the field of energy 
generation, especially nuclear power.  Neither the EC nor the CMEA proposed a 
corqrehensive  program of comn  action:  Soviet economists tended to recognize 
the problems of learning EC technicalities, and vice versa, but maintained 
that an integrated CMEA market was  the inevitable result of the economic 
reforms and restructuring in Eastern Europe and the USSR. 
Phare  and the  EZRD:  The Phototropic Hypothesis 
At the G-7  ltSumnit  of the Archt1  in smr  1989, before the explosion of 
the anti-authoritarian revolution throughout Central and Eastern Europe, 
Poland and Hungary were at the center of discussion.  These were the two 
countries that were making the swiftest progress toward institutionalizing 
political pluralism.  A  major result of the so-called Sumnit of the Arch in 
surr~ner  1.989  was the creation of the Poland/Hungary Aid  to Restructure 
Economies program (known  as Phare and sometimes in English called the 
Lighthouse program, a translation of the French a~ronym).~  Phare was financed 
by the EC in the amount of 300 million ecus, of which Poland received two- 
thirds and Hungary the remainder.  Also at the Sumit.of  the Arch, the EC was 
asked to take on the role of coordinating program the aid program of  its 
4.  A.  explained below, the Phare program has since been expanded to 
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  One is tempted to suggest that 
the expanded Phare be called in English the Rainbow program, after the French 
Arc-en-ciel, for Aide A  la Restructuration  de Certaines Economies Non- 
Connnunistes pour Intkgrer llEurope  Lentemnt. 
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member states and of the twelve non-EC members of 0,  an idea that the U.S. 
strongly supported.  This was the first time that the EC had ever been asked 
to coordinate the activities of governments other than those of its member- 
states.  (Thus  after the Sumnit of the Arch the G-7 for Poland and Hungary 
became the G-24, or G-25 if one includes the EC itself.) 
The EC did not originally intend to take the measures incorporated into 
Phare unt.il  the mid-1990s.  Phare itself was largely an emergency program. 
Thus the first stage of Phare in winter 1989-90 included emergency food aid to 
see Poland through the winter.  Pharets  second stage provided for input 
programs for food production so that such aid would not have to be permanent. 
The ECts  strategy appears to have been to "build out" from these agreements: 
the Phare assistance can be conceptually integrated into the progression from 
trade agreement to cooperation agreement to financial protocol to association 
agreement.  In particular, the evolving EC relationship with Central'and 
Eastern Europe can be integrated into the framework of a trade and cooperation 
agreement.  For the mjority of former East-bloc countries, the trade-and- 
cooperation agreement is the first generation of agreement, including, for 
state-trading countries:  de facto MFN status and the lifting of any existing 
quantitative restrictions (QRs);  plus,  in the case of non-GATT members such as 
the USSR counterconcessions  on trade, the allocation of hard currency for 
imports, and the easier provision of import licenses.  (For  GA?T  members, it 
is necessary only to refer to the requisite articles of the Havana Charter, so 
special provisions do not have to be introduced.) 
Phare's third stage is analogous to the cooperation provisions of a 
trade-and-cooperation agreement:  the EC granted trade concessions, created 
export possibilities for Central and Eastern Europe, and lowered some tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions.  At the end of 1989, the EC decided to 
accelerate building-down of nontariff barriers (i.e., quantitative 
restrict'ions and tariff concessions on products of special interest 
particularly in agriculture on such items as geese, lamb, mushrooms, and smll 
fruits and berries) and a more rigorous application of the Generalized System 
of Preferences to qualifying former East-bloc countries. 
Several EC members had resisted Delors's calls for coordinating export 
credit term to Eastern Europe (this  was already regulated by the OD),  but 
the rapidity of events persuaded countries such as the UK and France of the 
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need for better co-ordination, even at the expense of arrogating to the EC 
some aspects of East-West political relations usually reserved to sovereign 
states.  In April 1989, EC foreign ministers decided that events in Eastern 
Europe were coming so fast that they recognized the inseparability of EC 
comnercial policy (which  they do not usually concern themelves  with) and 
political cooperation.  Seeking to maintain a ''differentiated approach" to the 
countries of the region, they suspended talks on economic cooperation with 
Romia  because of the country's failure to meet CSCE obligations on human 
rights (suppression  of dissent and forced relocation of peasants) but were 
very promising toward Poland following the "round-table1'  agreements in Warsaw 
between the government and opposition.  In particular, the ministers sought a 
rapid conclusion to the trade-and-cooperation agreement between the EC and 
Poland.  Both the UK and France specifically suggested training in EC 
countries for Polish managers. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), an 
investment bank with subscribed capital of roughly $10,000 million, was  an 
initiative of the French government, not of the EC.  France's mtives in 
proposing to create the EBRD were to prevent the U.S.  from dominating Western 
political initiatives, and to prevent Germany from dominating EC economic 
initiatives, toward Central and Eastern Europe.  However, neither Germany nor 
the United Kingdom saw  the wisdom in making the WRD an exclusive Cornunity 
institution.  Early anticipations in Brussels that internal EC political 
reasons would lead to the EBRD's finding a home within Comnunity structures, 
and that it would have competence to lend to EC members, turn out to have been 
mistaken. 
France, supported by Italy, has argued that so massive a problem as the 
reconstruction and development of Central and Eastern Europe requires a 
massive response that necessitates a multifunctional institution, and they see 
the EBRD in this role.  Article 2 of the EBRD statutes refers to ttcooperation" 
with other institutions (meaning  IMF and the World Bank  in particular).  One 
possibility, then, is that EBRD would seek the suggest appropriate 
microeconomic policies for Central and Eastern Europe, for example, reform of 
the taxation structure.  However, this would require research personnel that 
EBRD will not have.  Indeed, the real scope of the EBRDts  functions remain to 
be determined in practice, and part  (but  only part) of the reason for this is 
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staffing levels.  With its headquarters established in London, and with the 
ratification of  its charter expected before spring 1991, the EBRD should be 
operating by 15 April 1991 with a rrraximum staff of 200 which will double by 
1992.  This level of personnel does not leave mch  scope for activity beyond 
administrative and treasury functions. 
The EBRD is not to be confused with the European Investment Bank  (EIB), 
which is the ECts  own credit-granting bank and operates only within the 
Comity  itself.  A non-EC institution such as the EBRD was also necessary 
due to a longstanding difference of bureaucratic interests between the EC 
Comnission and the EIB:  the EIB traditionally grants credit on good term and 
then goes to the EC  Co~ssion  to ask them to cover the risk.  Moreover, the 
EBRD was needed because the EIB1s  authority to lend to EC non-members is 
decided on a case-by-case basis.  The EIB was  involved in the earliest stages 
of the Phare program but, given institutional restrictions, clearly could not 
manage the magnitude the loans foreseen for Central and Eastern Europe. 
However, both the EIB and the EC Comnission have subscribed capital to the 
EBRD and both are both represented in EBRD decision making. 
The members of the EBRD are the G-24 plus the European CMEA  members 
(including  the USSR) and Yugoslavia.  At the Paris meeting in 1989, a good 
deal of time was devoted to discussing whether and how the USSR would 
participate.  Since it was the French who invited the Soviets, and since the 
USSR did not ask to be coupled to the expanded Phare program, the idea was 
raised that the Soviets should be a shareholder in EBRD and not a client. 
Naturally, the Soviets were not happy with this.  The matter was further 
discussed at the official founding meeting of EBRD in January 1990, and in 
March it was decided that the USSR would be accepted as a member of  its 
council, and as a possible debtor, with its capital subscription fixed at six 
per cent of the total. 
The relationship between the EBRD and the EC's Phare program remains to 
be clarified.  The EBRD-Phare relationship is problematic.  The EBRD1s  head 
Jacques Attali thought the bank would take over Phare, whereas EC sees EBRD as 
an element of Phare.  Phare will eventually be phased out as a separate 
program as the Association Agreements to be negotiated with Central and 
Eastern Europe enter into force.  Those agreements will frame EC assistance to 
the region.  (U.S. aid is still on a yearly basis only and my  well trickle 
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out or be concentrated on macroeconomic aid limited by IMF conditionality. 
The EC is taking the initiative through IMF for macroeconomic aid to Central 
and Eastern Europe, and the IMF' my  become a leader in this later, although 
the EC is now coordinating it although not in the context of the Association 
Agreements  .  1 
The Bmerqing Frammrk of BC Relations with Central and Eastern Europe 
Phare Beconres  a Biq Bang:  The Short Term Broadens and Deepens 
The pattern of EC  relations with third parties usually begins with a 
trade agreement and follows with a cooperation agreement (usually  integrated 
into a trade-and-cooperation agreement that also creates a framework around 
the previously existing trade agreement).  Subsequently, a financial protocol 
may be signed that leads later to an association agreement.  Finally, the 
association agreement itself my  pave the way for full membership.  Greece and 
Spain, for example, followed basically this pattern.  However, there is no 
automatic progression, and even the signature of an association agreement does 
not guarantee eventual full membership.  (Turkey  is a case in point.) 
Nevertheless, even if history does not always repeat itself, this pattern does 
provide a useful framework for interpreting the recent evolution of the ECts 
relations with the former East-bloc countrie~.~ 
Although the Phare program originally provided largely for emergency aid, 
still that assistance can be conceptually integrated into the progression from 
trade agreement to cooperation agreement to financial protocol to association 
agreement.  Indeed, the EC originally did not expect to take the measures 
5.  "Central and Eastern Europet1  is newly consecrated term for referring 
to these countries.  It becm  current before the GDR became part of the FRG. 
Originally (at  the EC) one spoke of the llQ.IEA  countries" or the "east bloc." 
The Hungarians began bruiting the term ItEast  European countriestt  to replace 
this, then the FRG proposed to the EPC group the term "Central and Eastern 
Europe" (without thinking about the reference to Mitteleuropa), and the EC 
adopted the terminologically officially.  What this rubric includes the USSR 
is a mtter of taste.  Some people in the West speak of "the Soviet Union and 
Central and Eastern Europett  (much  as they used to speak of  ItThe  Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europet1),  whereas an increasing number of specialists even in 
Moscow insist that the USSR is not an East European country.  (If  it is not 
East European, it certainly is not West European.) 
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incorporated in Phare until the mid-1990s.  The creation of Phare was 
relatively easy as a political decision, but putting it into practice has been 
more difficult.  Before the democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the second half of 1989, the EC had  I'differentiated" among the 
countries there on case-by-case basis.  That is why Poland and Hungary were 
included in the program and others were excluded.  At the time, the EC's 
chosen instrument to promote reforms was the trade and cooperation agreements. 
The next component would be financial protocols, but these will not be 
signed with Central and Eastern Europe, with the possible exception of 
Yugoslavia if  it still exists.  Existing elements of the Phare and expanded 
Phare programs could be integrated at least conceptually into the framework of 
a financial protocol.  The EC my  for example provide counterpart funds to 
Poland in zlotys to restructure agriculture; the G-24 may make GSP-type 
unilateral concessions; Poland has a stabilization program while Hungary has a 
balance-of-payments aid program.  However, any protocols that there may be 
would likely not be negotiated with the former East-bloc countries but would 
be unilateral gifts on the part of the EC in the Phare context of "activities 
assisting economic reform.''  The G-24 considers all former East-bloc countries 
except the USSR to be eligible for this.  The June 1990 ministerial meeting of 
the 24 will'probably  decide to extend Phare (following  on meetings of December 
1989 and February 1990).  The fourth component would be association 
agreements.  (Note  that technically there is no legal status such as 
"associate membership1';  there are only association agreements.)  An 
association agreement my  be considered as the sum of trade and trade-and- 
cooperation agreements, plus a financial protocol, plus the prospect that 
preferential trade treatment by the EC would be reciprocated into bilateral 
free trade. 
Following the upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe in fall 1989 and 
winter 1989-90, the G-24 approved in mid-February 1990 an outline of 
conditions for extending Phare beyond.Poland  and Hungary.  These conditions 
emphasized the need to move toward democracy, including the respect for law 
and human rights, and toward a liberal economy.  The Central and East European 
countries soon returned memoranda to the EC in which they spelt out as best 
they could their specific economic needs.  At the request of Poland and 
Hungary, training and education were a big part of Phare and will no doubt 
This text dates from 11 January 1991. "The Architecture of E.C.  Relations  ...,'I  page 14 
remain important sectors of the expanded program, including language training, 
training in how to be a businessman in a market economy, training of local 
government administrators, and so forth. 
Before the March 1990 elections in the GDR, it was generally assumed that 
the expanded Phare would include it.  The GDR established diplomatic relations 
with the EC in August 1988 and opened its mission in Brussels the following 
March.  The first framework agreement to emerge was a trade-and-cooperation 
agreement that granted most-favored-nation status and gradually reduced 
quantitative restrictions to eliminate them by 1995 except in some sensitive 
areas such as agriculture.  At the time both the EC and the GDR thought it 
better to start bilateral relations with an agreement in hand than to wait for 
the question of unification to be settled.  However, at the Dublin meeting of 
the EC prime ministers in late April 1990, Chancellor Kohl opposed the 
extension of EC aid to the GDR.  Such a program would have been beyond Bonn's 
direct control, and Kohl did not want the Comnunity to have this means for 
influencing Germn  unification. 
The use of vigilantes by the Iliescu regime in Bucharest to put down 
anti-government protests in June 1990 led to an EC decision to freeze such aid 
to Romania.  Although Romania signed a cooperation agreement with the EC in 
the late 1970s, the political situation there is still too fluid, and there is 
uncertainty whether the two conditions of the G-24 will be met there. 
Yugoslavia, which has mde  great progress since the beginning of 1990 in 
controlling its inflation and has taken steps toward reducing its foreign 
debt, is also be  in the expanded Phare.  The expanded Phare program was 
predicated on progress toward the institutionalization of political pluralism, 
the adoption of guarantees of the freedom of assembly and of the press, etc. 
Indeed, Romnia and Czechoslovakia were told that they would have to show 
evidence of reforming their political systems and introducing political 
democracy before they were granted EC aid, and the repression of 
demonstrations in Bucharest in June brought swift EC criticism accompanied by 
the suspension of aid. 
The expanded Phare is budgeted at the level of 500 million ecus this 
year, scheduled to rise to 800 million next year.  The.G-24  suspended, as of 1 
January 1990, all restrictions specifically applicable to state-trading 
restrictions such as quantitative restrictions.  The GSP is also being 
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applied.  QRs  on state-trading countries are being dismantled through trade- 
and-cooperation agreements.  Such restrictions will disappear probably by 1995 
at the latest for Bulgaria and the USSR and earlier for other countries, with 
the possible exception of some "sensitivew  products (in  the sense of being 
politically sensitive within the EC). 
Romania received urgent medical aid and food aid but were promised 
nothing more unless they put into action promises for political 
liberalization.  Czechoslovakia needed neither food nor a fund for stabilizing 
their balance of payments.  However, it did seek special credits for 
industrial restructuring.  Yugoslavia already had a financial protocol and 
wanted an extra billion to llsanitize"  is banks.  The problem was  that the 
combinats in Yugoslavia owned their own banks, from which they could force  bad 
loans.  So out of $10 billion in loans, almost three-quarters were bad:  in 
Kosovo, nearly all were bad; in Serbia, some were bad; and in Slovenia, almost 
none were bad.  The Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic had developed a system of 
buying bad debts from banks in the form of bonds, which the banks would buy 
back after ten years; but the center needed funds to put the scheme into 
practice.  They started with $250 million and asked the G-24  for another 
billion. 
A  number of training and education prograrrs have been housed in the EC 
bureaucracy, where it performs the same coordinating function on behalf of the 
G-24.  The Tempus programs aims to develop higher education, and elements of 
the institutional development my  include transfer of persons.  It is set up 
according to Central and Eastern Europe country needs that are identified by 
them:  engineering, applied sciences, management, languages, law, enviromnt, 
and agriculture.  The Tempus program, and other training program,  were 
intended to be housed in Berlin at the European Training Foundation (ETF),  but 
the ETF  has so far been blocked for this reason (even  though its institutional 
structure and procedures are already decided), by those who want the European 
Parliament to stay in Strasbourg rather than move to Brussels and who 
therefore are delaying implementation of any decision to establish any EC 
offices outside Brussels.  If the Berlin Center is not established soon, it 
my  simply go by the boards. 
The other three programs of note are Lingua, Erasmus, and Comet.  The 
Lingua program provides language training at.  all levels.  It started in 1990- 
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91  at the level of higher education, and other levels will be added in 1991- 
92.  It is probably the most difficult of these program to administer because 
of the variation across recipient countries of the particular needs, and 
across the donor countries of the resources available.  It is currently funded 
at a level of 200 million ecu over five years. 
The Erasmus program provides for travel to study.  The problem of this 
program comes from its overwhelming acceptance and the interest it evokes.  It 
is funded at the level of 192  million ecu over three years, but the EC cannot 
bear this cost; the host countries must do so.  It has funded 1700 projects 
benefit 40,000 students and expects to quadruple its size. 
The Comet program seeks to establish and reinforce the links between 
industry and higher education.  This program has had start-up  problems because 
establishing such links is especially problematic for such countries as Poland 
and Hungary, where the functions of teaching and research have traditionally 
been divorced within whole system of higher education.  It is  funded at the 
level of 200 million ecus over five years and, like Lingua and Erasmus, is 
scheduled to expire in 1994. 
Association lkpxemnts:  The Medium Term Accelerates 
As of spring 1990 the G-24/EC were negotiating trade-and-cooperation 
agreements with most or all former East-bloc states.  They were negotiated in 
parallel with determinations of aid required and amount to "expanded Phare" 
program.  Longer term relations with the EC and the former East-bloc states 
will fall into the framework of f'association  agreements," as provided in 
Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome.  However, the Treaty of Rome specifies 
neither the content nor the context of association agreements.  Countries 
having association agreements with the EC are sometimes referred to as 
"associate members" of the organization, but this is erroneous.  There is no 
legal standing such as associate membership.  Rather, an association agreement 
implies an institutional relationship assuming a stage-by-stage progression of 
relations on the basis of  joint institutions that are something more than 
mixed comissions. 
The next step in EC relations with East and Central Europe will not be a 
financial protocol but an association agreement.  The EC members want to avoid 
financial protocols because these entail definite financial comitmnts  even 
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for specific projects, which rnay  be very costly and inappropriate.  (The 
Association Agreements will not constitute a customs union because Central and 
Eastern Europe will not be adopting the ACP  regime in their trade with 
developing countries.)  Probably some of the terms that would usually be 
included in a financial protocol will be integrated into association 
agreements, but without separate financial protocols beforehand.  Association 
agreements are nonpreferential free-trade arrangements as the EC has with 
EFTA.  (Customs  tariffs, for example, are not touched by a bilateral 
agreement, but a two-way building-down can be begun first by the EX  as has 
already been happening the case of Yugoslavia.  Bilateral agreements create 
mixed comnissions but association agreements create standing comnissions.)  An 
association agreement would not by itself exclude eventual EC membership but 
the EC would seek to avoid very rapid and loose association. 
The surmner and fall of 1990 saw  a great deal of movement.  On the basis 
of meetings in late October, the EC Comnission proposed in late October 1990 
to the Council of Ministers ideas outlining general shape of the Association 
Agreements and was  mandated to proceed in late November with negotiations to 
sign Association Agreements with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.  In rnid- 
December the negotiations themelves  were authorized by the Council of 
Ministers and the first meetings were held the weekend before Christmas to 
open negotiations formlly  before the end of the year, to be taken up 
substantively beginning in mid-January.  These negotiations are projected to 
conclude by sumner 1991.  Although there is no doubt of the political will on 
any side, this timetable may be slightly optimistic, since the agreements will 
be complicated in content also for legal reasons. 
The Association Agreements with Central and Eastern Europe will be of a 
different kind, although still coming under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty. 
They are in the context of the new European architecture covering everything 
that my  be linked to eventual political and economic integration.  Article 
239 permits associated countries to apply eventually for membership, but as 
regards Central and Eastern Europe there are neither comnitments nor 
exclusions in this respect.  The Association Agreements will include clauses 
on political cooperation and dialogue with these countries, with which 
dialogue is already ongoing through the European Political Cooperation 
structures. 
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These Agreements will be of a mixed nature, in the sense that they will 
contain provisions falling into EC competence as well as provisions that do 
not (e.g.,  free movement and political cooperation).  When the Agreements are 
ratified by the EC Council the provisions falling under EC competence will 
enter imnediately into force.  The other sections will enter into force 
following ratification of the Agreements by the various national parliaments. 
During all this type, political cooperation will continue under way in one 
form or another.  The EC deliberations on Economic and Monetary Union and on 
Economic and Political Union will not affect the Association Agreements. 
Negotiations on the latter are projected to be concluded in sumner 1991, and 
to enter into force at the beginning of 1992, whereas amendments to the Rome 
Treaty dealing with EMU and EPU may require as my  as three years to be drawn 
up and approved. 
Were  is consensus in Brussels on the outline of these eventual 
Association Agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.  They will 
not be modelled on the agreements with Greece and Turkey.  Rather, they will 
be tailor-made political umbrellas for the present trade-and-cooperation 
agreements, creating a framework to encompass the manifold cooperation which 
until now has been ongoing on ad hoc bases.  The Association Agreements will 
do five things: 
1. Establish free trade in industrial products with a period of 
transition to give East Central European industry time to prepare for 
competition.  Provisions accompanying such a cormnercial free trade area (e.g., 
anti-dumping, state aid, competition, safeguards)  and including the 278 
regulations necessary for establishing the Single Market will be elaborated, 
including specific solutions to trade in agricultural products and also 
assuring compatibility with GATT textile regulations. 
2. Give additional impetus to the economic reform including but not 
limited to privatization. 
3.  Include conditionality on the progression of the steps of reform.  For 
example, monetary and fiscal reforms are necessary to permit the free movement 
of services. 
4. Provide for free movement of persons, capital, and services.  Barriers 
to the latter two will be dismntled relatively quickly.  These countries know 
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they need the services and need to have them up to Western standards.  As it 
is in their interest to make their legislation compatible with EC law (so  as 
not to have to change it in, say, ten years), ministries in these countries 
have received directives from their governments to check compatibility of 
their regulations with EC  law before promulgating the former.  The Association 
Agreements will also provide these countries with access to Western legal 
expertise necessary to introduce such compatible legislation on banking, 
insurance, and company law, and on accounting:  these constituting the legal 
structure permitting companies to establish themelves  on the national 
territory. 
5.  Provide a continuing financial acconrnodation under the Phare program 
until 1992.  This accomnodation is with the EIB and European Coal and Steel 
Comnity,  coordinated with the policies of international financial 
institutions (IMF, EBRD, World Bank, and G-24). 
Central and Eastern mope  want positive developments from EC for 
therrselves, but EC my  be unwilling or unable to deliver: then Phare will go 
on for longer, perhaps beyond even five years, though with Czechoslovakia, 
e.g.,  there my  be a fast agreement, but with others no.  The Agreements will 
be adopted to the specificities of each country:  Poland, for example, my 
continue "shock therapy" whereas Hungary rrray  require a more cautious approach. 
From the EC standpoint, however, two mjor issues in the eyes of Central and 
Eastern Europe are problematic:  free movement of workers and free access for 
agricultural products.  Formlly speaking, the expanded Phare program has no 
rationale for continued existence after the Association Agreements, which will 
regularize the assistance they provide, come into force.  In practical terms, 
however, such programs as Ternpus will survive the formal demise of Phare as an 
element of Association Agreement. 
The International Re-organization of Eronomic Relations in Europe 
H;TA:  To Be or Not To Be? 
EC-EFTA negotiations will probably be finished before summer 1991, and 
they will not lead to type of agreement EFTA desired.  The EFTA countries will 
therefore probably continue to  apply individually.  EFTA will not get its 
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desired full participation in the European Economic Space, because of  its 
insistence on such provisions as a joint EEC-EFTA council with equal 
participation in decision making by the two organizations.  It is doubtful 
whether such a council and such participation would make a concrete difference 
to EFTA:  about two-thirds of the 1992 legislation--the 278 bills on standards 
and regulations that the EC members must adopt for the single market to enter 
into force--have already been approved by the respective national parliaments. 
Such decisionmaking could therefore only refer to so-called "flankingtt  issues 
such issues as monetary policy, educational policy, and regional development. 
(Regional  development is  especially nettlesome, since the EC has wanted EFTA 
to accept the notion of vtcohesiont~--on  model of the ECts  Mediterranean 
program--meaning assistance to the poorer areas of the  EC  such as Ireland, 
Greece, and Portugal.  EC regional and social funds for this purpose will have 
amounted to 14 billion ecus by 1992.) 
Before it became too late (which it now is), EFTA found that it could 
negotiate with the EC so as to harmonize its national systems with those of 
the Ec.  This opened to the EFTA countries the possibility of closer economic 
ties with the EC,  but without the political obligations of membership.  As 
recently as fall 1989, for example, it seem  that procedures could be 
constructed to resolve EC-EFTA problems at the interorganizational level, such 
as a free-trade arrangement covering goods and services produced in the 
"European economic area.tf This would have been in the interest of EFTA 
countries since they generally have stricter requirements--in consumer safety 
for example--than do the EC countries.  In response, the Finns were prepared 
to loosen their own restrictions on foreign ownership of land and securities. 
Some of the EFTA countries may have problems in accession to the EC. 
Swedish foreign policy neutrality may be a question, for example, even though 
the Swedish parliament voted in December 1990 to submit an application for 
membership in 1991.  Pro-EC Swedish opinion is split over the question whether 
they should join as soon as possible, the better to dilute the EC1s 
supranationality, or wait and see.  Because of the EC attitude toward Sweden, 
the second will prevail.  The preservation of the Sweden's social system from 
pressure by external requirements will be a sensitive issue.  Austria has an 
application pending, even though such neutrality is enshrined in its state 
treaty; it had hoped to use multilateral (EFTA-wide)  approaches to the EC to 
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preserve this.  Norway and Finland will be the next to apply.  Finnish public 
opinion is strongly pro-EC, but polls reveal that nearly a quarter of the 
Finnish population believe the country is already a der.  Norway does not 
have the neutrality problem--it is a NATO member--but has as strong 
isolationist strand in its public opinion that led its voters to vote against 
joining the Comity  in a plebiscite in the early 1970s.  Its principal 
concerns are shipping and the energy market.  Swiss foreign policy also 
conform to neutral lines, although if Sweden asks for membership it is hard 
to see how this argument against EC accession can be used in Switzerland, 
where the financial institutions (to  name only one sector) are de facto more 
integrated into the EC than those of some of its menher countries.  The EC 
might wish Iceland then to join for the sake of completeness, since Iceland 
only real concern appears to be fisheries policy, with the exception  of labor 
mobility, a concern that the Swiss share. 
In mid-December 1990, Jacques Delors publicly acknowledged for the first 
time, speaking in Strasbourg, the EC will have to accept an increase in its 
membership.  Whether he had EFTA members or the former CMEA  members in mind  is 
not clear.  Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary may soon enjoy greater 
advantages in their relations with the EC, than the EFTA  countries would have 
enjoyed under the umbrella of a joint EC-EFTA "European economic area." 
The EFTA  countries cooperate by and large with the EC countries in 
providing assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, because they are members 
of the OECD and therefore fall under the G-24 umbrella coordinated by the EC 
from Brussels.  The EFTA countries are in the Comet and Tempus program, and 
negotiations are under way to include them in the Erasmus program by 1992. 
The EFTA countries, in their bilateral trade relations with Central and 
Eastern Europe, will align their policies and regulations with the content of 
the Association Agreements now under bilateral negotiation between the EC and 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.  The EFTA  countries, particularly in 
Scandinavia, have been providing important assistance to the Baltic republics 
of the Soviet Union, although EC will not have bilateral contact with the 
Balts unless Moscow gives a green light. 
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CMEA:  00 sont les n&nages  d 'antan? 
In early 1990 the CMEA  created an expert cornnittee to make proposals for 
transforming the organization, but events overtook them.  Czechoslovakia 
presided the working group that examined the possibilities for reform.  With 
Hungary and Poland, it constituted a lobby for profound reform, also not 
excluding regional cooperation but with indefinite ideas in this regard. 
Delors believes that intra-East European coordination should be enhanced, but 
this depends upon the countries concerned.  In a certain sense, organized 
economic cooperation among Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia would be 
advantageous to them all--there is  a certain complementarity  to their 
industrial structures--but  the M=  is  not making any real effort to promote 
such cooperation.  For some in those countries, such cooperation is only 
reminiscent of the CMEA,  and they are intent to be treated as individual 
countries by th EC rather than as a bloc.  Some non-industrial cooperation is 
motivated by external actors (Japan  bought food from Hungary to give to Poland 
under Phare), but it is not very much in absolute terms.  As early as spring 
1989, Hungary and Poland were leaning westward; Italy lobbies for Yugoslavia, 
and France for Romania; Bulgaria has no real lobby in the EC for its 
interests.  As of 1  January 1991, CMEA will trade on a mket  basis using 
convertible currencies.  This will permit price comparisons with Western 
countries, allowing for an increase in productivity.  Problem of bilateral 
clearing with the transferable ruble will be replaced by problem of credits 
and payment conditions. 
The structure and competitiveness of the CMEA as an institution remin 
unclear.  It could end up as a secretariat perhaps similar to OECD and in this 
way develop its own functions and structures.  (For example, the International 
Investment Bank might be useful in the future as financial instrument, 
including financial obligations to members, to change the system of work to 
promote not investments according to bilateral or multilateral agreements, but 
rather to finance comnercial banks and enterprises in Central and Eastern 
Europe:  whereas at present it  is  involved only in big projects under 
governmental agreements; it could finance joint or multilateral projects of a 
cormnercial (i.e., not state-trading) nature.  Alternatively, it could work 
with state banks to give credits to help restructure national economies.  The 
CMEA's IBEC could conceivably play a similar role.  The decision to use old 
This text dates from 11 January 1991. ''The  Architecture of E.C.  Relations ...," page 23 
CMEA structures will have to be political decision for political reasons 
because there is probably little they can do that can't be done in other ways. 
When the CMEA members begin financing their foreign trade with 
convertible currencies, this will permit comparison with Western countries and 
so lead eventually perhaps to increasing their productivity.  Instead of 
bilateral clearing with the use of the transferable ruble, there will be the 
problem of fixing the conditions of credits and payments.  The CMEA should 
retain some of  its functions as a conversation partner for the EC, and some of 
its institutions  could facilitate mutually beneficial economic cooperation 
among its member states. 
The CMEA Executive Council in January 1991 dissolved the organization and 
created a follow-on Organization for International Economic Coope~ation.~  The 
new statute and concept of this organization, still to be finalized, will 
still have important barter elements and a strong bilateral touch with 
multilateralism still missing.  More than half of Central and Eastern Europe's 
trade is still with the USSR.  Central and Eastern Europe are looking at the 
West and at increasing EC trade but are still energy dependent on SU and will 
still have to sell some products to Soviet Union for several years. 
Principles for the new trade system are to include market prices, hard 
currency, etc.,  but not revised intra-CMEA trade.  The quickness with which 
German unification was achieved may  in fact complicate the process of making 
all East-bloc currencies convertible.  The Ostmark could have served as a  kind 
of bridge during a more gradual process of German unification. 
Deals have already begun to be struck with economic sub-units of the 
Soviet Union:  trade between Poland and the Ukraine, for example; or an 
agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Tiumen oblast to supply transport 
vehicles in return for oil deliveries.  A series of bilateral interstate 
agreements were also concluded in  fall 1990.  The new CMEA statute will 
probably involve the organization in OECD-type analyses.  More important than 
the CMEA follow-on is what will happen in foreign trade matters mng  CMEA 
members.  This will be outside CMEA  institutional framework:  e.g., 
Association Agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia can include 
6.  See also Christian Meier, tlCOMECON:  A  Follow-on Organization is 
Planned,lt  NATO Review (October  1990), for details. 
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free trade but will not work if there are trade barriers among them.  The CMEA 
or its follow-on organization will remain useful to EC as diplomatic courier, 
transmitting documents and so on, and should rerrrain a confederal organization 
permitting the ensemble of members of CMEA to treat general questions, 
especially the environment. 
EC relations with the states of Central and Eastern Europe are somewhat 
in the same category as with EFTA  members:  in Brussels people think that the 
Twelve should be strengthened before any more major steps are taken toward 
admitting more members, and all the non-members are agenda-takers.  The M: 
will give development aid to Central and Eastern Europe but is not looking to 
be a pole of attraction, although it inevitably will be one.  The problems of 
the two groups of countries are in some ways incomparable:  the EC is  still 
trying to decide what mechanism to use for collecting value-added taxes, and 
D 
in Central and Eastern Europe  it is difficult to determine the value of 
anything due to the absence of price system. 
Politicians and other public figures in the West sometimes seem convinced 
that what the region needs is a good investment insurance scheme.  However, 
the establishment of the aforementioned legal regimes are prerequisites, 
because insurance insures against risk, whereas the present situation is one 
of certainty:  certainty that the legal foundations for foreign investment 
have not been laid.  The pressing problem in EC relations with Central and 
Eastern Europe (and  with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in particular) is 
not only providing technical advice but also persuading national parliaments 
to give time to the questions and adopt necessary laws:  not to mention 
finding East European civil servants who understand the problems from a 
Western cultural perspective.  For example, mny  economists in the region lack 
the necessary analytical techniques and consequently speak in grand term of 
overarching changes, thus avoiding specificity.  It is, then, for Central and 
Eastern Europe, a question of national will and resources.  Political elites 
and civil servants in the region do not have the necessary skills and 
training. 
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The example of Poland is instructive because it enjoys one of the better 
situations and more favorable prospects.  Poland has a fairly stable currency 
and pre-war comnercial law inspired by Germ  standards.  If she could sort 
out the question of land ownership, things could slowly be set right.  But, 
like all Central and Eastern Europe countries, she needs a system  of proper'ty 
law:  and not only property law, but also accounting law, contract law, and 
inheritance law.  There are whole bodies of law  that don't exist in Central 
and Eastern Europe.  EBRD can publicize the existing situation but one needs 
to know  what the situation is on the ground there.  The problem is not advice 
or access to it but rather persuading the adoption of changes and getting 
people there to do something.  (There  may be a danger of the systemst  being 
re-created becoming fragmented and chopped up by the intrusion of foreign 
trade regimes.)  The Association Agreements will include provisions for West 
European specialists to assist Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in setting 
up these legal regimes, but this assistance is very expensive and the EC will 
have to find a way to pay for it. 
It would be dangerous if Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia considered 
that Association Agreements with the EC were a panacea for all their problems; 
they are not.  What is most important to them is for Western companies to 
establish themelves in those countries, which they are not doing now.  For 
exanrple, land ownership is unresolved; so who will build a factory when the 
land might go to the old owner following a legal decision three years from 
now.  To solve these problem, not just technical and legal expertise are 
needed from the West.  Cadre have to formed also in the East.  So the EC will 
train trainers and teach teachers (on  condition that they stay at home after 
for a fixed period of time, say three to six years, otherwise they will jump 
to the West to get a high-paying job), in coordination  with the World Bank and 
others. 
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